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1.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A ; 118(10)2021 03 09.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1165022

Subject(s)
COVID-19 , Humans , SARS-CoV-2
2.
PLoS One ; 15(11): e0240652, 2020.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-910299

ABSTRACT

In the current COVID19 crisis many national healthcare systems are confronted with an acute shortage of tests for confirming SARS-CoV-2 infections. For low overall infection levels in the population the pooling of samples can drastically amplify the testing capacity. Here we present a formula to estimate the optimal group-size for pooling, the efficiency gain (tested persons per test), and the expected upper bound of missed infections in pooled testing, all as a function of the population-wide infection levels and the false negative/positive rates of the currently used PCR tests. Assuming an infection level of 0.1% and a false negative rate of 2%, the optimal pool-size is about 34, and an efficiency gain of about 15 tested persons per test is possible. For an infection level of 1% the optimal pool-size is 11, the efficiency gain is 5.1 tested persons per test. For an infection level of 10% the optimal pool-size reduces to about 4, the efficiency gain is about 1.7 tested persons per test. For infection levels of 30% and higher there is no more benefit from pooling. To see to what extent replicates of the pooled tests improve the estimate of the maximal number of missed infections, we present results for 1 to 5 replicates.


Subject(s)
Betacoronavirus/genetics , Clinical Laboratory Techniques/methods , Coronavirus Infections/diagnosis , Coronavirus Infections/epidemiology , Diagnostic Tests, Routine/methods , Pandemics , Pneumonia, Viral/diagnosis , Pneumonia, Viral/epidemiology , Specimen Handling/methods , COVID-19 , Coronavirus Infections/virology , Humans , Pneumonia, Viral/virology , Polymerase Chain Reaction/methods , RNA, Viral/genetics , SARS-CoV-2
3.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A ; 117(37): 22684-22689, 2020 09 15.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-729025

ABSTRACT

Many countries have passed their first COVID-19 epidemic peak. Traditional epidemiological models describe this as a result of nonpharmaceutical interventions pushing the growth rate below the recovery rate. In this phase of the pandemic many countries showed an almost linear growth of confirmed cases for extended time periods. This new containment regime is hard to explain by traditional models where either infection numbers grow explosively until herd immunity is reached or the epidemic is completely suppressed. Here we offer an explanation of this puzzling observation based on the structure of contact networks. We show that for any given transmission rate there exists a critical number of social contacts, [Formula: see text], below which linear growth and low infection prevalence must occur. Above [Formula: see text] traditional epidemiological dynamics take place, e.g., as in susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) models. When calibrating our model to empirical estimates of the transmission rate and the number of days being contagious, we find [Formula: see text] Assuming realistic contact networks with a degree of about 5, and assuming that lockdown measures would reduce that to household size (about 2.5), we reproduce actual infection curves with remarkable precision, without fitting or fine-tuning of parameters. In particular, we compare the United States and Austria, as examples for one country that initially did not impose measures and one that responded with a severe lockdown early on. Our findings question the applicability of standard compartmental models to describe the COVID-19 containment phase. The probability to observe linear growth in these is practically zero.


Subject(s)
Coronavirus Infections/epidemiology , Models, Statistical , Pneumonia, Viral/epidemiology , Basic Reproduction Number , COVID-19 , Coronavirus Infections/prevention & control , Coronavirus Infections/transmission , Humans , Pandemics/prevention & control , Pneumonia, Viral/prevention & control , Pneumonia, Viral/transmission , Quarantine/statistics & numerical data
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